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Abstract 
 
A new technique for estimating countries‟ de facto exchange rate regimes synthesizes 
two approaches.  One approach estimates the implicit de facto basket weights in an OLS 
regression of the local currency value rate against major currency values.  Here the 
hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility.  The second estimates the de facto degree 
of exchange rate flexibility by observing how exchange market pressure is allowed to 
show up. Here the hypothesis is an anchor to the dollar or some other single major 
currency, but with a possibly substantial degree of exchange rate flexibility around that 
anchor.  It is important to have available a technique that can cover both dimensions:  
inferring anchor weights and the flexibility parameter.   We test the synthesis technique 
on a variety of fixers, floaters, and basket peggers.   We find that real world data demand 
a statistical technique that allows parameters and regimes to shift frequently.  
Accordingly we here take the next step in estimation of de facto exchange rate regimes: 
endogenous estimation of parameter breakpoints, following Bai and Perron. 
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As is by now well-known, the exchange rate regimes that countries follow in 
practice (de facto) often depart from the regimes that they announce officially (de jure).  
Many countries that say they float in fact intervene heavily in the foreign exchange 
market.
1   Many countries that say they fix in fact devalue when trouble arises.
2    Many 
countries that say they target a basket of major currencies in fact fiddle with the weights.
3 
A number of economists have offered attempts at de facto classifications, placing 
countries into the “true” categories, such as fixed, floating, and intermediate.
4    
Unfortunately, these classification schemes disagree with each other as much as they 
disagree with the de jure classification.
5  Something must be wrong. 
 
I. The existing techniques for estimating de facto regimes and their drawbacks 
Several things are wrong.    First, attempts to infer statistically a country‟s degree 
of exchange rate flexibility from the variability of its exchange rate alone ignore that 
some countries experience greater shocks than others.      
 
I.1  Exchange Market Pressure 
That problem can be addressed by comparing exchange rate variability to foreign 
exchange reserve variability, as do Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003a,b, 2005).    A useful way to specify this approach is in terms of 
                                                 
1 “Fear of floating:”  Calvo and Reinhart (2001, 2002); Reinhart (2000). 
2 “The mirage of fixed exchange rates:”  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Klein and Marion 
(1997). 
3 Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000). 
4 Important examples include Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2000, 2002), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), Shambaugh (2004), and those cited in other footnotes below.  Tavlas, Dellas and 
Stockman (2008) survey the literature. 
5 Frankel (Table 1, 2004) and Bénassy-Quéré, et al (Table 5, 2004).   3 
Exchange Market Pressure, defined as the sum of the change in the value of a currency 
and the change in its reserves.
6     Exchange Market Pressure represents shocks in 
demand for the currency.  The flexibility parameter can be estimated from the propensity 
of the central bank to let these shocks show up in the price of the currency (floating) or 
the quantity of the currency (fixed) or somewhere in between (intermediate exchange rate 
regime).      But even these papers have a second limitation:  they generally impose the 
choice of the major currency around which the country in question defines its value, most 
often the dollar.   For some countries -- to whatever extent the authorities seek to stabilize 
the exchange rate -- it is fairly evident what the anchor currency must be (the dollar for 
countries in the Caribbean and most of Latin America, the euro in most of Central 
Europe).   But for others it is much less evident, especially those with geographically 
diversified trade (Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East, much of Africa, and the Southern 
Cone of South America).    In many cases, one cannot even presume that the anchor is a 
single major currency.   It would be better to estimate endogenously whether the anchor 
currency is the dollar, the euro, some other currency, or some basket of currencies.    
 
I.2 Basket Weights 
A third set of papers is designed precisely to do this, to estimate the anchor 
currency, or more generally to estimate the currencies in the basket and their respective 
                                                 
6 The progenitor of the Exchange Market Pressure variable, in a rather different context, 
was Girton and Roper (1977).  Here we impose the a priori constraint that a one 
percentage increase in the foreign exchange value of the currency and a one percentage 
increase in the supply of the currency (the change in reserves as a share of the monetary 
base) have equal weights, rather than normalizing by standard deviations as Girton and 
Roper did.     4 
weights.
7  The approach is simply to run a regression of the change in the value of the 
local currency against the changes in the values of the dollar, euro, and other major 
currencies that are potential candidates for the anchor currency or basket of currencies.   
In the special case where the country in question in fact does follow a perfect basket peg, 
the technique is an exceptionally apt application of OLS regression.  Under the null 
hypothesis, it should be easy to recover precise estimates of the weights.  The fit should 
be perfect, an extreme rarity in econometrics:  the standard error of the regression should 
be zero, and R
2 = 100%.   
The reason to work in terms of changes rather than levels is the likelihood of non-
stationarity.  Concern for nonstationarity in this equation goes beyond the common 
refrain of modern time series econometrics, the inability to reject statistically a unit root.   
There is often good reason a priori to consider the possibility that the regime builds in a 
trend.   In the context of countries with a history of high inflation, the hypothesis of 
interest is that the currency regime is a crawling peg, that is, that there is a steady 
negative trend in its value.
8    In the context of the Chinese yuan in the years since 1994, 
the hypothesis of interest is a positive trend in its value.
9   Working in terms of first 
                                                 
7 Examples include Frankel (1993), Frankel and Wei (1994, 1995, 2007), Bénassy-Quéré 
(1999), and Bénassy-Quéré, Coeuré, and Mignon (2004), among others. 
8 The hypothesis of a constant rate of crawl is readily combined with the hypothesis that 
the anchor is a basket, and even with the hypothesis of variability around the anchor.  The 
combined BBC regime (Basket / Band / Crawl) has been recommended for a variety of 
countries (Williamson, 2001).   It was, for example, the regime followed by Chile in the 
1990s, de facto as well as de jure  (Frankel, Schmukler and Servén, 2000). 
9  In 2005, Chinese authorities announced a switch to a new exchange rate regime:  The 
exchange rate would henceforth be set with reference to a basket of other currencies, with 
numerical weights unannounced, allowing cumulatively a movement of up to +/- .3% per 
day.   Initial applications of the implicit basket estimation technique to the yuan exchange 
rate suggested that the de facto regime continued to be essentially a dollar peg in 2005 
and 2006.   E.g., Ogawa (2006), Frankel and Wei (2007) and other papers cited there.      5 
differences is a clean way to allow for nonstationarity.  One simply includes a constant 
term to allow for the possibility of a crawl in the currency, whether against the dollar 
alone or a broader basket.   
  Although the equation is very well-specified under the null hypothesis of a basket 
peg or other peg, it is on less firm ground under the alternative hypothesis.   The 
approach neglects to include anything to help make sense out of the error term under the 
alternative hypothesis that the country is not perfectly pegged to a major currency or to a 
basket, but rather has adopted a degree of flexibility around its anchor.   In other words, 
the limitation of the implicit-weights estimation approach is the same as the virtue of the 
flexibility-parameter estimation approach and vice versa.   The latter is well-specified to 
estimate the flexibility parameter only if the anchor is already known, while the former is 
well-specified to estimate the anchor only if there is no flexibility.   
Frankel and Wei (2008) synthesize the technique that estimates the flexibility 
parameter with the technique that estimates the degree of flexibility.   The synthesis 
technique brings the two branches of the literature together to produce a complete 
equation suitable for use in inferring the de facto regime across the spectrum of flexibility 
and across the array of possible anchors.
10  
 
I.3   Regime change 
                                                 
10 Frankel (2009) applies the synthesis technique to data on the Chinese exchange rate 
from 2005 to 2008, finding that the yuan during the latter part of this period did move 
away from the dollar peg, shifting some weight to the euro.   6 
All these approaches, including the synthesis technique, suffer from a further 
limitation.   In practice many currencies, perhaps the majority, do not maintain a single 
consistent regime for more than a few years at a time, but rather switch parameters every 
few years and even switch regimes.
11    The official regime of Chile, for example, 
changed parameters – basket weights, width of band, rate of crawl -- 18 times from 
September 1982 to September 1999 (after which it started floating), an average of once a 
year.   If such changes always fell on January 1, one might have some hope of being able 
to estimate the equation year by year, though this would be difficult if one were limited to 
only 12 monthly observations.  Since the parameter changes can come anytime, the 
standard strategy, of estimating an equation for each year, or each interval of two years, 
or more years, cannot hope to capture the reality.   The frequent changes in regimes and 
parameters that many countries experience may be the most important reason why 
different authors‟ classification schemes give different results among the universe of 
currencies, and none seems to get fully at the truth. 
  The next step is to apply statistical techniques that allow for the possibility that 
the regime and parameter governing a currency shifts, and shifts at irregular intervals.
12   
If one knows the hypothesized date of a shift, e.g., because it is officially announced, then 
one can test that the structural break took place de facto by means of the classic test of 
Chow (1960).   More often, however, the structural breaks could fall at any date.  In this 
paper we adopt the estimation technology developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), 
                                                 
11 Masson (2001).   
12 Fidrmuc (2010) applies to the Chinese currency a Kalman filter approach to allow the 
regime parameters to evolve gradually over time.   We prefer to think in terms of 
structural breaks, because the word “regime” seems to connote a set of parameter that 
hold still for at least a short while.   Zeileis, Patnaik, and Shah (2010) apply to the same 
problem a general (quasi-)likelihood-based regression models.   7 
who provided estimators, test statistics, and efficient algorithms appropriate to a linear 
model with multiple possible structural changes at unknown dates. 
 
II. The synthesis equation 
Algebraically, if the home currency, with value defined as H, is pegged to 
currencies with values defined as X1, X2, … and Xn, and weights equal to w1, w2, … and 
wn, then 
logH(t+s) - logH(t)  =  c  +   ∑  w(j) [logX(j, t+s) - logX(j, t)]      (1) 
One methodological question must be addressed.  How do we define the “value” 
of each of the currencies?  This is the question of the numeraire.
 13  If the exchange rate is 
truly a basket peg, the choice of numeraire currency is immaterial; we estimate the 
weights accurately regardless.
14  If the true regime is more variable than a rigid basket 
peg, then the choice of numeraire does make some difference to the estimation.  Some 
authors in the past have used a remote currency, such as the Swiss franc.   
A weighted index such as a trade-weighted measure or the SDR (Special Drawing 
Right, an IMF unit composed of a basket of most important major currencies) is probably 
                                                 
13  Frankel and Wei (1995) used the SDR as numeraire;  Frankel (1993) used purchasing 
power over a consumer basket of domestic goods; Frankel and Wei (1994, 2006) and 
Ohno (1999) used the Swiss franc; Bénassy-Quéré (1999), the dollar; Frankel, Schmukler 
and Servén (2000), a GDP-weighted basket of five major currencies.  Bénassy-Quéré, 
Coeuré, and Mignon (2004) propose a modification of the methodology, with a method 
of moments approach;  the advantage of the modification is that it does not depend on the 
choice of a numeraire currency.  
14 If the linear equation holds precisely in terms of any one “correct” numeraire, then add 
the log exchange rate between that numeraire and any arbitrary unit to see that the 
equation also holds precisely in terms of the arbitrary numeraire.  This assumes the 
weights add to 1, and there is no error term, constant term, or other non-currency 
variable.   8 
more appropriate.  Here is why.  Assume the true regime is a target zone or a managed 
float centered around a reference basket, where the authorities intervene to an extent that 
depends on the magnitude of the deviation;  this seems the logical alternative hypothesis 
in which a strict basket peg is nested.  The error term in the equation represents shocks in 
demand for the currency that the authorities allow to be partially reflected in the 
exchange rate (but only partially, because they intervene if the shocks are large).  Then 
one should use a numeraire that is similar to the yardstick used by the authorities in 
measuring what constitutes a large deviation.  The authorities are unlikely to use the 
Swiss franc or Canadian dollar in thinking about the size of deviations from their 
reference point.  They are more likely to use a weighted average of major currencies.  If 
we use a similar measure in the equation, it should help minimize the possibility of 
correlation between the error term and the numeraire.  Similarly, if there is a trend in the 
exchange rate equation (a constant term in the changes equation) representing deliberate 
gradual appreciation of the currency, then the value of the local currency should be 
defined in terms of whatever weighted exchange rate index the authorities are likely to 
use in thinking about the trend.  These considerations suggest a numeraire that is itself 
composed of a basket of currencies.  Here, as in Frankel and Wei (1995, 2007), we 
choose the SDR.
15 
There is a good argument for constraining the weights on the currencies to add up 
to 1.  The easiest way to implement the adding up constraint is to run the regressions with 
the changes in the log of the local currency value on the left-hand side of the equation 
transformed by subtracting off the changes in the log value of one of the currencies, say 
                                                 
15 Among the extensions and robustness checks in Frankel and Wei (2007) was a check 
whether the results were sensitive to the numeraire, as between the SDR and gold.   9 
the pound, and the changes in the values of the other major currencies on the right-hand 
side transformed in the same way.     To see this, we repeat equation (1): 
Δ log Ht   = c +  ∑ w(j) [Δ logX(j)t ] 
= c + β(1) Δ log $ t  + β(2) Δ log ¥t + β(3) Δ log €t  + ʱ Δ log £t   
We want to impose the adding up constraint ʱ = 1 - β(1) - β(2) - β(3) …   
We implement it by running the regression equation (2): 
[Δ logH t - Δ log £t ]      = c  +   β(1) [Δ log $t - Δ log £t ]   
                        +   β(2)[ Δ log ¥t  - Δ log £t]  +  β(3) [Δ log €t -Δ log £t]     (2) 
One can recover the implicit weight on the value of the pound by adding the 
estimated weights on the non-dollar currencies, and subtracting the sum from 1.  (We 
usually report this residual coefficient estimate in the last row of the tables.)  Imposing 
the constraint sharpens the estimates a bit.
16 
 
Our synthesis equation is: 
Δ log H t       =   c  +   ∑ w(j) Δ logX(j) t     +    ʴ { Δ EMP t }  +  u t            (3) 
where Δ emp t  denotes the percentage change in exchange market pressure, that is, the 
increase in international demand for the Home currency, which may show up either in the 
its price or its quantity, depending on the policies of the monetary authorities.  Here we 
define the percentage change in total exchange market pressure by 
 Δ EMP t     ≡  Δ logH t  + ΔRes t /MB t , 
                                                 
16 The choice of which currency to drop from the right-hand side in order to impose the 
adding up constraint, in this case the pound, is completely immaterial to the estimates.  
The choice of which currency to use as numeraire, by contrast, can make a difference to 
the estimates (to the extent that the true regime differs substantially from a perfect basket 
peg).   10 
where Res ≡ foreign exchange reserves and MB ≡ Monetary Base.  The w(j) coefficients 
capture the de facto weights on the constituent currencies.  The coefficient ʴ captures the 
de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility.  A high ʴ means the currency floats purely, 
because there is little foreign exchange market intervention (few changes in reserves; in 
the limit,  ΔRes  = 0,  so  ΔEMPt  =  ΔlogH  and ʴ  = 1)  .  ʴ =0 means the exchange rate 
is purely fixed, because it never changes in value.  A majority of currencies lie 
somewhere in between.  
  We repeat equation (3), with the four major basket currencies made explicit: 
Δ log H t   =   c  +   ∑ w(j) [Δ logX t]   + ʴ { Δ emp t } + u t                          (3’) 
    = c + w(1) Δ log $ t + w (2) Δ log €t + w (3) Δ log ¥t + w (4) Δ log £t +    
                                                                                 + ʴ { Δ EMP t }   +   u t  . 
We want to impose the adding up constraint w(4) = 1 - w(1) -w(2)- w(3)  - … 
We implement the constraint by running the regression equation (4): 
[ΔlogH t – Δlog £t]   =   c  +  w(1) [Δlog $t - Δlog £t]   
+ w(2) [Δlog €t - Δlog £t]  + w(3) [Δlog ¥t  - Δlog £t]  + δ{ΔEMP t } +  ut         (4) 
 
III. Endogenous Estimation of Structural Breaks 
We  embed  the  above-discussed  synthesis  technique  for  estimating  de  facto 
exchange rate regime in a multiple structural change model proposed by Bai and Perron 
(1998). 
 
III.1 Estimating the Optimal Partition at a Given Number of Breaks     11 
With this integrated inference framework, we can track the shifts in a country's 
currency regime over time. The baseline multiple-break (with m breaks, that is, m+1 
regimes) of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) is described in (5), 
t i t t t u z x y       
' '                                              (5) 
1 ,..., 1     ;     ; 0     ; ,..., 1 1 0 1         m i T T T T T t m i i  
  For convenience, we use the same notation as in Bai and Perron (2003):  t y  is the 
dependent time series variable at time t. This is a general-form partial structural change 
model.  ) 1 (     p xt  is the covariates vector whose parameter vector   will not evolve over 
time.  ) 1 (     q zt is the covariates vector whose parameter vector    will  experience  m 
structural  breaks  and  have  m+1  set  of  values  in  these  m+1  different  regimes: 
) 1 ,..., 1 (      m i i  . The break points ) ,..., ( 1 m T T  are modeled as unknown in advance. With 
the observed time series data ) , x , ( t t t z y , equation (5) is used to model and derive the 
break dates  ) ,..., ( 1 m T T  which split the whole time series into m+1 different linear regimes 
as well as estimate the regime-dependent parameters  i   in the respective regimes and 
regime-independent parameters  . 
  This partial structural change model can save substantial degrees of freedom if 
some  parameters  are  known  to  be  constant  across  different  regimes.  In  our  case  of 
estimating the exchange rate regime switches, since we do not know which currencies the 
monetary authority will keep invariant over time, we treat our application to the currency 
regime as a pure structural change model by assuming  p=0 , which is illustrated by (6),   12 
t t i t j i
k
j
j i i t u EMP X w c H          

 , ,
1
, log log                                (6) 
   1 ,..., 1     ;     ; 0     ; ,..., 1 1 0 1         m i T T T T T t m i i  
Specification (6) therefore models  m+1 exchange rate regime switches, with respective 
basket weights and flexibility parameter in each of the regime. 
  Bai and Perron (1998) adopt the general least-squares principle to estimate the 
break dates: for any of the m-partitions ) ,..., ( 1 m T T , a set of parameters i c , j i w ,  and  i   are 
derived to minimize the sum of squared residuals as represented by (7), 
2
1
, ,
1
,
1
1 1
log log   
  

 






      
i
i
T
T t
t i t j i
k
j
j i i t
m
i
EMP X w c H                    (7) 
i c , j i w ,  and  i   are  the  estimated  set  of  parameters  for  each  possible  m-
partition ) ,..., ( 1 m T T ,  that is,  ) ,..., ( 1 m i i T T c c  ,  ) ,..., ( 1 m i i T T    and  ) ,..., ( 1 , , m j i j i T T w w  . 
Corresponding to the specific set of parameters i c , j i w ,  and  i  for a m-partition ) ,..., ( 1 m T T , 
a  minimized  sum  of  squared  residuals  is  calculated,  i.e.  by  substituting  the  values 
of i c , j i w ,  and  i  into (7), the objective function. 
  The last step is to search for the best m-partition  ) ,..., ( 1 m T T  that can minimize the 
partition-dependent objective function globally as shown by (8), 
2
1
, ,
1
,
1
1 ,...,
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1
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1 1
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i T T
m EMP X w c H T T      (8)   13 
Finally,  according  to  the  estimated  best  m-partition ) ,..., (
^
1
^
m T T ,  we  can  easily 
recover  the  relevant  set  of  coefficients ) ,..., (
^
1
^ ^ ^
m i i T T c c  ,  ) ,..., (
^
1
^
,
^
,
^
m j i j i T T w w   and 
) ,..., (
^
1
^ ^ ^
m i i T T    ,  which  correspond  to  the  parameters  for  each  of  the  respective 
regimes. 
  A grid search algorithm can be used to seek for the global minimizer. However, 
the computational complexity of the traditional grid search algorithm to estimate a global 
minimizer like (8) is at the order of  ) (
m T O operations, which is formidable even when m 
just grows moderately larger than 2. The additional innovation of Bai and Perron (2003) 
is to apply a dynamic programming principle to this global minimization procedure,
17 
which finally limits the cost of computation  to ) (
2 T O . We follow their computational 
approach in this paper. 
 
III.2 Testing and Estimating the Number of Breaks 
  The  methodology  discussed  in  Section  3.1  can  help  us  to  locate  the  best  m-
partition  and  find  out  the  associated  regime-specific  basket  weights  and  flexibility 
parameter, assuming we have known the explicit number of breaks m. However, we do 
not know the accurate break number in advance. Then we also need a reliable way to 
estimate the break number m.  
                                                 
17  Detailed discussion on dynamic programming is available in Cormen, et al (2001).  
Prodan (2008) argues that the Bai and Perron sequential procedure can lead to size 
distortions (too many rejections of the null hypothesis).   14 
  Bai and Perron (1998) proposed a sequential test supF(ℓ+1/ℓ), i.e. testing ℓ versus 
ℓ+1 breaks. This testing approach is also based on the general least-squares principle: if 
the value of the objective function (the minimized least-squares) by assuming  ℓ+1 breaks 
is significantly smaller than the case by assuming ℓ breaks, the hypothesis of ℓ breaks 
will be rejected in favor of a ℓ+1 breaks alternative. The recommended procedure by Bai 
and Perron (2003) is to firstly test 0 versus 1 break; if we can reject the hypothesis of zero 
break, then go on to test 1 versus 2 break; in other words, we sequentially apply the test 
of supF(ℓ+1/ℓ), until the hypothesis of  m+1  breaks is rejected versus the alternative of  
m  breaks.  Then  we  can  make  the  conclusion  that  an  m-break-partition  model  is 
appropriate and derive the corresponding estimates of parameters in each of the  m+1 
regimes in terms of the methodology of Section 3.1. 
 
IV. An Illustration:  Estimation for Five Currencies 
Exchange rate data are available on a daily basis, but data on foreign exchange 
reserves and the monetary base have historically been available only on a monthly basis 
for most developing countries.   If structural shifts occur as frequently as once a year, we 
will have a hard time discerning this with the monthly data, no matter what the 
econometric technique.   We limit the anchor currency or basket to four major candidates 
– dollar, euro, yen and pound -- but this still requires estimation of five parameters: three 
currency weights, the flexibility parameter, and the crawl term. 
Fortunately, some of the emerging market currencies of greatest interest now 
make available their data on reserves on a weekly basis or even daily in the case of a few   15 
Latin American countries.   We conclude this paper by illustrating the estimation 
technique for five of these currencies, in Table 1. 
  For  all five  currencies,  the statistical  estimates  suggest  managed floats  during 
most of the period 1999-2009.   This was a new development for emerging markets.  
Most of the countries had some variety of a peg before the currency crises of the 1990s.  
But the Bai-Perron test shows statistically significant structural breaks for every currency, 
even when the threshold is set high, at the 1% level of statistical significance.   
Table 1A reports estimation for the Mexican peso using weekly data (5 structural 
breaks).  The peso is known as a floater.  To the extent that Mexico intervenes to reduce 
exchange rate variation, the dollar is the primary anchor, but there also appears to have 
been some weight on the euro starting in 2003.   From August 2006 to December 2008, 
the coefficient on Exchange Market Pressure is essentially zero, surprisingly, suggesting 
heavier intervention around a dollar target.  But in the period starting December 2008, the 
peso once again moved away from the currency to the north, when the worst phase of the 
global liquidity crisis hit and the dollar appreciated. 
For the other four currencies, although the exchange rate and reserve data are both 
available weekly, the monetary base is not.   Recall that our way of scaling the change in 
reserves it so express it as a share of the monetary base.  For this purpose, we interpolate 
between the monthly monetary base data. 
Chile (with 3 estimated structural breaks) appears a managed floater throughout.  
The anchor is exclusively the dollar in some periods, but puts significant weight on the 
euro in other periods.   Russia (3 structural breaks) is similar, except that the weight on   16 
the dollar is always significantly less than 1.  For Thailand (3 structural breaks), the share 
of the dollar in the anchor basket is slightly above .6, but usually significantly less than 1.  
The euro and yen show weights of about .2 each between January 1999 and September 
2006.   India (5 structural breaks) apparently fixed its exchange rate during two of the 
sub-periods, but pursued a managed float in the other four sub-periods.
18  The dollar was 
always the most important of the anchor currencies, but the euro was also significant in 
four out of six sub-periods, and the yen in two. 
The estimation results are no tidier than the reality of these currencies , which do 
not stick with any one clean regime for long.  Applications of the technique to examples 
of  currencies following  clean  pegs to  a  basket or  to a  single currency are available 
elsewhere.
19  Possible future extensions include providing a classification scheme that 
includes most or all members of the IMF,  attempting to analyze reasons for parameter 
shifts, and applying a Threshold Autoregressive Technique to capture more accurately the 
right specification for those countries believed to be following a target zone, rather than 
more general managed floating. 
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Table 1:   
Estimation of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes -- Five Currencies, Weekly Data 
 
 
Table 1A. Identifying Break Points in Mexican Exchange Rate Regime  
M1:1999-M7:2009 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  1/21/1999-
9/2/2001 
9/9/2001-
3/18/2003 
3/25/2003-
7/29/2006 
8/5/2006-
1/28/2008 
2/4/2008- 
12/15/2008 
12/22/2008-
7/29/2009 
US dollar  0.92***  0.88***  0.62***  1.11***  0.96***  0.20 
  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.19)  (0.22) 
euro  0.14  -0.09  0.30***  0.20*  0.51***  0.51*** 
  (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
Jpn yen  -0.05  0.22***  0.08  -0.34***  -0.33**  0.18 
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
△EMP  0.14***  0.32***  0.17***  0.02  0.07  0.28*** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.04) 
Constant  0.00  -0.00***  -0.00*  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Observations  131  78  168  76  46  29 
R-squared  0.62  0.86  0.69  0.67  0.54  0.78 
Br. Pound  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.02  -0.14  0.11 
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Table 1B. Identifying Break Points in Chile’s Exchange Rate Regime  
M1:1999-M3:2009 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  1/28/1999-
4/8/2003 
4/15/2003-
7/28/2004 
8/4/2004-
11/4/2007 
11/11/2007-
3/4/2009 
US dollar  0.91***  0.25  0.73***  0.46** 
  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.22) 
euro  -0.05  0.54***  0.21  0.94*** 
  (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
Jpn yen  0.06  0.26*  0.06  -0.24* 
  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.13) 
△EMP  0.05***  0.10***  0.03**  0.18*** 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.06) 
Constant  -0.00**  0.00  0.00**  -0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Observations  181  55  139  55 
R-squared  0.55  0.49  0.49  0.37 
Br. Pound  0.07  -0.05  0.01  -0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1C. Identifying Break Points in Russia's Exchange Rate Regime  
M1:1999-M7:2009 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  1/14/1999-
7/8/1999 
7/15/1999-
10/20/2004 
10/27/2004-
12/22/2008 
12/31/2008-
7/29/2009 
US dollar  0.06  0.82***  0.48***  -0.18 
  (0.68)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.25) 
euro  0.83**  0.06  0.42***  1.61*** 
  (0.38)  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.24) 
Jpn yen  -0.02  0.07**  -0.00  -0.01 
  (0.17)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.20) 
△EMP  0.85***  0.11***  0.03***  0.26*** 
  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.08) 
Constant  0.00  -0.00***  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Observations  26  268  213  30 
R-squared  0.80  0.82  0.83  0.69 
Br. Pound  0.13  0.06  0.10  -0.42 
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Table 1D. Identifying Break Points in Thailand’s Exchange Rate Regime  
M1:1999-M5:2009 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  1/21/1999-
8/5/2001 
8/12/2001-
9/9/2006 
9/16/2006-
3/25/2007 
4/1/2007-
5/6/2009 
US dollar  0.62***  0.61***  0.80***  0.70*** 
  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.28)  (0.05) 
euro  0.26***  0.17***  -0.08  0.19*** 
  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.59)  (0.04) 
Jpn yen  0.15***  0.25***  0.16  0.04 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.30)  (0.03) 
△EMP  0.20***  0.06***  0.50***  0.03** 
  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.17)  (0.01) 
Constant  -0.00**  0.00  -0.01  -0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Observations  129  257  27  108 
R-squared  0.66  0.76  0.64  0.90 
Br. Pound  -0.02  -0.04  0.12  0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1E. Identifying Break Points in India's Exchange Rate Regime  
M1:2000-M5:2009  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  1/14/2000-
10/27/2000 
11/3/2000-
6/17/2001 
6/24/2001-
12/31/2001 
1/14/2002-
9/23/2003 
9/30/2003-
2/25/2007 
3/4/2007-
5/6/2009 
US dollar  0.77***  0.92***  0.66***  0.91***  0.72***  0.59*** 
  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.10) 
Euro  0.12***  0.10***  0.23***  0.03  0.06  0.32*** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
Jpn yen  0.09***  0.04*  0.05  0.03  0.24***  0.02 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
△EMP  0.44***  0.04  0.46***  0.06  0.15***  0.37*** 
  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
Observations  42  32  28  88  172  109 
R-squared  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.86  0.78 
Br. Pound  0.02  -0.06  0.06  0.03  -0.01  0.08 
 
Notes: 
1.  △EMP is the exchange rate market pressure variable, which is defined as the 
percentage increase in the value of the local currency plus the increase in 
reserves (scaled by the monetary base) 
  Definition: 
1
1] Re [Re
log

 
   
t
t t
t t MB
serve serve
H EMP  
2.  All data are weekly 
3.  Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 